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2024 WOR: Airtanker Drop Fatality – Incident within an Incident (IWI)

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Airtanker Drop Fatality - Incident within an Incident (IWI)

The Incident: August 13th, 2018 was the 11th day for a Utah Multi-Agency Taskforce and their Taskforce Leader (TFLD) on the Ranch Fire, a fire within the Mendocino Complex. During the morning operational briefing, the TFLD, his Utah Multi-Agency Taskforce, and a Strike Team of engines were assigned to Branch I, Division Charlie. After the briefing, division resources headed out to the line to reinforce dozer line and support it with a hose lay for an upcoming firing operation. 

At approximately 1300 with increased fire activity, airtankers were ordered to support Division Charlie of the Mendocino Complex. Division/Group Supervisor (DIVS) Charlie requested to drop retardant adjacent to the dozer line. Coordination of the operation between DIVS Charlie, Air Attack, and the Aerial Supervision Module (ASM) was established. At approximately 1540, DIVS Charlie told DIVS Charlie (T) that “Airtankers will be working in the area.” That message on the division’s tactical frequency was acknowledged and subsequently broadcast to “clear the area out” to the rest of the division. Only one Strike Team Leader acknowledged hearing the message.

After three airtanker drops were completed between 1600 and 1700 with the last drop being too far from the dozer line, DIVS Charlie requested the next drop to be “snugged up” and closer to the dozer line. The ASM acknowledged the request and performed a “show me” flight for the Very Large Airtanker (VLAT) to see the intended drop path and altitude. At approximately 1725, the ASM and VLAT circled back around and initiated their final approach. Obscured by vegetation, a rise in the terrain was directly along the proposed drop location resulting in the retardant being dropped approximately 100 feet above the canopy instead of the predicted 250 feet above canopy. The lower altitude and force of the drop uprooted an 87-foot tall Douglas Fir that struck the TFLD causing fatal injuries. Three other firefighters were struck by falling debris and suffered moderate to major injuries. Within seconds, an Incident Within an Incident was declared and patient care was established.

(select image to enlarge)

The Response: After the tree strike an IWI was declared, and Advanced Life Support (ALS) responders provided care and transported four patients to the hospital for further treatment. 

  • The Task Force Leader suffered fatal crushing injuries from the tree strike. 
  • One Fire Captain suffered broken ribs, deep muscle contusions, and ligament damage to extremities. 
  • One Fire Captain suffered scratches and abrasions. 
  • One Fire Apparatus Engineer suffered deep muscle contusions and ligament damage.
     

Discussion Questions:

  • Recognition and communication about the upcoming airtanker drops were only acknowledged by one Strike Team Leader, what else could have been done to ensure everyone was situationally aware of the operations and potential hazards? 
  • Imagine becoming the IWI IC, what are you thinking and what are your first actions? 
  • Imagine being the only first responder to provide care, which patient needs your attention first? 
  • Have you practiced filling out the Medical Incident Report and communicating it for multiple patients? What resources are needed for this IWI? Does a fatality change that process? 
     

Resources:

 

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